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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine intra-industry contagion and the following
apparent violations of the efficient market hypothesis around large one-day price decline events in
individual stocks.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines daily stock returns around one-day price
declines of 10 percent or more for event stocks and their rivals. Using techniques similar to those used
in Bremer and Sweeney and Cox and Peterson, the paper includes event stocks whose prices are at least
$10 per share prior to the event to reduce the possible price reversal induced by bid-ask price bounce. As is
typical for the literature, the stock daily abnormal return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the
actual daily stock return and the estimated stock return based on the market model estimated over a
200-trading-day pre-event period [2220, 221]. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each stock are
formed by aggregating the individual daily stock ARs. Denoting the large price decline event day as day 0,
we examine the ARs of 41 trading days [220, þ 20], the CARs for the [þ1, þ 3] period, and the CARs for
the [þ4, þ 20] period. Cross-sectional average ARs and CARs are calculated and tested for statistical
significance. Furthermore, the paper examines whether the post-event abnormal stock returns for the
event firm and its rivals can be explained by prior event firm and industry variables.
Findings – On average, after an event, the event stock experiences a positive three-day AR (S&P 600
stocks) followed by a 17-day negative AR (both S&P 500 and 600 stocks). Moreover, for that 17-day
period: the rivals’ stocks outperform the event firms’ stocks and the event firms’ returns are statistically
significantly related to prior variables. The paper also finds statistically significant relationships
between the prior variables and the rivals’ post-event stock returns. It provides an intra-industry effects
explanation for these results.
Originality/value – The paper offers insights into abnormal stock returns, for the event firm and its
rivals, following the event firm’s large one-day stock price drop.
Keywords Finance, Financial markets, Financial performance, Stock returns
Paper type Research paper

I. Introduction
According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), traders should not be able to make
abnormal positive returns using publicly available information. Several studies test it by
examining stock price changes immediately following their large price declines. Atkins
and Dyl (1990) find market overreaction in daily winners and losers but conclude that
such reversals are not significant after controlling for the bid-ask price bounce and
transaction costs. In contrast, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) note that for 1962-1986,
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Fortune 500 stocks that have a large one-day price drop tend to experience a significant
abnormal price reversal over the next three days in violation of the weak form EMH.
Cox and Peterson (1994) study NYSE (large capitalization), AMEX, and National
Market System stocks (small cap stocks traded on the NASDAQ) for the 1963-June 1991
time period and note the post-price drop three-day reversal. Further, they note that the
reversals are greater for small cap than large cap stocks and that the reversal disappears
even for the small cap stocks by the October 1987 stock price crash. They also find no
evidence that stocks with greater event-day price decline have greater reversal and
conclude that their data do not support the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) overreaction
hypothesis. They attribute the pre-October 1987 reversals to bid-ask price bounce and
illiquidity effects and argue that these effects were more pronounced for small cap stocks
and disappeared as the market became more liquid by the time of the October 1987 crash.
However, it seems unlikely that the October 1987 stock market crash should coincide
with a rise in market liquidity and their conclusion that the small cap reversal
disappeared in the post-October 1987 period may be due to their short post-October 1987
period.
Cox and Peterson (1994) also note that the event-day price decline inexplicably, and in
apparent violation of the EMH, resumes in the period starting the fourth day after the
event and ending 20 days after the event (denoted hereafter as [þ 4, þ 20]). Finally, they
show, as further evidence against the overreaction hypothesis, that the event stock’s
performance in the [þ 4, þ 20] period is worse; the greater is its event-day price drop.
Cox and Peterson (1994) have not been updated to see if the apparent violation of the
EMH persists and whether the evidence against the overreaction hypothesis continues.
This literature also does not consider the event firms’ rivals’ stock price movements to
see if intra-industry effects exist and how quickly the news gets reflected into the rivals’
stocks’ prices. Nor does this literature consider that there may be a feedback response
from the rivals’ stocks’ prices to the event firms’ stock prices.
The event firm’s rivals may experience contagion or competitive (intra-industry)
effects. They experience a contagion effect if their stock prices decline approximately
coincident with the event. Assuming the event was due to an unexpected drop in the
demand forecast for the event firm’s products and services, a contagion would be
observed if, approximately coincident with the event, the market also reduced its
demand forecast for the event firm’s rivals’ products and services. A competitive effect
is defined as a negative correlation between the stock returns of the event firm and its
competing (i.e. rival) firms. Assuming the event was due to an unexpected drop in the
demand forecast for the event firm’s products and services, a competitive effect would be
observed if, approximately coincident with the event, the market increased its demand
forecast for the event firm’s rivals’ products and services (i.e. it unexpectedly forecast
that the industry demand will shift away from the event firm’s products and services
toward its rivals’ products and services, so that the rivals benefit from the event firm’s
problems).
Lang and Stulz (1992) studied event firm and their rivals’ abnormal stock returns for
the 11-day period [2 5, þ 5] around events for the 1970-1989 period for firms in both
the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. They found when:
.
the pre-event stock return correlation between the event firm and its rivals was
high; or

.

the industry had high financial leverage, that both the event firm and its rivals’
stock prices statistically significantly declined (i.e. the contagion effect
dominated).

On the other hand, when there was low financial leverage and the market was highly
concentrated, the rivals’ stock prices statistically significantly rose (i.e. the competitive
effect dominated). In addition to Lang and Stulz (1992), others, such as Slovin et al. (1991),
Laux et al. (1998) and Akhigbe and Madura (2008), have studied whether the contagion
or competitive effect dominates. It seems that the intra-industry effect literature has not
focused on the issue of the extent that the rivals’ response lags the event firms’ response;
however, the Lang and Stulz (1992) Table I results suggest that rivals’ response lags the
event firms’ response by about two days. This literature also does not consider that there
may be a feedback response from the rivals to the event firms; such feedback would
represent an EMH anomaly.
We examine the price movements of the event stocks as well as their respective
industry rivals around an event. In our paper, as in Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and
Cox and Peterson (1994), an event occurs when a stock’s price drops at least 10 percent
in one day. We examine the price movements of large cap (S&P 500) stocks for two
periods, 1973-2006 and 1995-2006. We also study the price movements of small cap
(S&P 600) stocks for 1995-2006. The 1995-2006 period is distinct from the pre-July 1991
period studied in Cox and Peterson (1994) and the period studied in Bremer and
Sweeney (1991). We examine both large and small cap stocks to see if the differences
between them, noted by Cox and Peterson (1994), hold.
Our contributions are in four main areas and focus on how efficiently publicly
available information becomes reflected in stock prices and what factors effect the event
firm’s and its rivals’ post-event abnormal returns (ARs). First, we examine the event
stocks’ ARs for the 41 days surrounding the event [2 20, þ 20] and address the
following issues studied primarily by Cox and Peterson (1994). Is the [þ 1, þ 3] period
positive abnormal stock return (i.e. reversal) present in the post-October 1987 stock price
crash period? Does the event-day negative abnormal stock return continue in the
[þ 4, þ 20] period? For both the Cox and Peterson (1994) [þ 1, þ 3] and [þ 4, þ 20]
periods are ARs present in either small or large cap stocks? We examine these issues
over a post Cox and Peterson (1994) period (i.e. 1995-2006, a much longer post-October
1987 period than in Cox and Peterson, 1994). A finding of yes to any of these extends the
apparently anomalous Cox and Peterson (1994) findings regarding the EMH.
Second, we determine whether intra-industry (where industry is defined by the
COMPUSTAT four-digit SIC) effects exist: preceding, during and following the event
stocks’ large one-day price decline. We add to the literature by studying the extent to
which a lag exists between the event firm’s price response and its rivals’ price response.
We extend the contagion versus competitive effect literature by: examining the issue for
both small and large cap stocks and extending the Lang and Stulz (1992) [2 5, þ 5]
period to the Cox and Peterson (1994) [2 20, þ 20] period. The intra-industry effects
literature has not addressed the issue of whether the intra-industry effects differ
depending on whether the firms are large or small cap. Given the Cox and Peterson (1994)
finding that the event firms’ post-event returns differed depending on whether the firm is
large cap or small cap, there is no reason to believe that the intra-industry effect and the
speed with which it occurs will not differ for large and small cap firms. To the extent that
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Table I.
Abnormal stock returns
around large stock price
decline (i.e. event) days
(for 3,112 events of S&P
500 stocks from 1973
through 2006)

Day

Event firms’ abnormal
Rivals portfolios’ abnormal
Rivals portfolios’
stock return (AR)
stock return (AR)
AR 2 event stocks’ AR
Average (%) Positive (%) Average (%) Positive (%) Average (%) Positive (%)

2 20
2 19
2 18
2 17
2 16
2 15
2 14
2 13
2 12
2 11
2 10
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1 through 3
4 through 20

2 0.0472
2 0.1199 * *
2 0.1130 * *
2 0.1629 * * *
2 0.0862
2 0.0268
2 0.0577
2 0.1921 * * *
2 0.1826 * * *
2 0.1163 *
2 0.1053 *
2 0.1229 *
2 0.0870
2 0.1433 * *
2 0.0474
2 0.1574 * *
2 0.2180 * * *
2 0.0381
2 0.1680 * *
2 0.7453 * * *
2 12.4665 * * *
0.1717 *
0.0302
0.0206
0.0154
2 0.0651
2 0.1189 *
2 0.1600 * *
0.1037
2 0.0368
2 0.0210
2 0.0484
2 0.0631
2 0.1025
0.0394
2 0.1299 *
2 0.0584
0.0835
0.0434
0.0586
2 0.0925
0.1865
2 0.8217 * * *

47.8 * *
48.2 * *
47.4 * * *
45.3 * * *
47.3 * * *
46.3 * * *
47.8 * *
46.8 * * *
47.3 * * *
46.4 * * *
46.6 * * *
46.6 * * *
47.0 * * *
47.3 * * *
47.9 * *
46.9 * * *
46.4 * * *
48.0 * *
45.5 * * *
40.9 * * *
0.7 * * *
53.1 * * *
50.8
48.0 * *
48.8
48.0 * *
46.6 * * *
45.9 * * *
48.6
48.8
50.5
48.8
49.0
47.5 * * *
49.4
46.6 * * *
49.6
49.7
48.9
48.9
46.4 * * *
51.1
45.8 * * *

20.0723 *
20.0281
0.2259 * * *
20.0475
20.1350 * * *
20.1933 * * *
20.0825 * *
0.0267
0.1163 * * *
0.0354
0.0506
20.0135
0.0544
0.0036
0.0834 * *
20.1225 * * *
20.1156 * * *
20.0153
20.0840 *
20.1470 * * *
20.5143 * * *
20.1769 * * *
0.1097 * *
20.0633
20.0954 * *
20.0552
0.0005
0.1161 * * *
20.0416
20.0651
0.1403 * * *
0.0017
0.1042 * * *
20.0438
0.1314 * * *
20.0438
20.1334 * * *
0.1878 * * *
0.1326 * * *
20.1323 * * *
20.0917 * *
20.1384 *
0.0431

47.1 * * *
49.0
52.2 * *
47.5 * * *
46.3 * * *
44.3 * * *
47.0 * * *
49.6
51.2
49.8
50.5
49.9
50.4
49.3
52.4 * * *
45.8 * * *
47.4 * * *
48.1 * *
49.1
47.2 * * *
39.5 * * *
47.9 * *
50.5
48.0 * *
46.3 * * *
48.4 *
51.0
50.3
48.7
47.4 * * *
52.4 * * *
48.9
51.5
48.8
49.6
49.1
46.1 * * *
51.4
50.5
47.3 * * *
47.4 * * *
47.3 * * *
50.2

2 0.0251
0.0918
0.3389 * * *
0.1154 *
2 0.0488
2 0.1664 * * *
2 0.0248
0.2188 * * *
0.2990 * * *
0.1517 * *
0.1559 * *
0.1095
0.1414 * *
0.1468 * *
0.1308 *
0.0349
0.1024
0.0229
0.0839
0.5982 * * *
11.9522 * * *
2 0.3486 * * *
0.0795
2 0.0839
2 0.1108
0.0098
0.1194
0.2761 * * *
2 0.1453 *
2 0.0283
0.1613 * *
0.0501
0.1673 * *
0.0587
0.0919
0.0861
2 0.0750
0.1042
0.0892
2 0.1909 * * *
0.0008
2 0.3249 * *
0.8648 * * *

50.1
51.7 *
53.5 * * *
52.0 * *
50.6
49.3
49.9
51.6 *
53.1 * * *
52.1 * *
52.6 * * *
52.9 * * *
52.3 * * *
52.1 * *
52.7 * * *
50.5
52.3 * *
51.4
52.7 * * *
57.5 * * *
99.5 * * *
46.6 * * *
49.1
49.7
49.6
51.5 *
52.7 * * *
53.8 * * *
50.0
50.3
50.5
50.8
50.5
52.2 * *
49.8
52.5 * * *
48.8
51.4
51.1
48.8
50.4
0.4875
0.5389 * * *

Notes: Significance at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels (two-tailed test); each event stock has an at least 10
percent event-day stock price drop (i.e. the event-day return is , ¼ 210 percent); its rival portfolio is
equally weighted and is composed of the indexes’ other stocks that have its SIC; the daily abnormal stock
return on day t (where t ¼ 220 to þ20) is the difference between the actual return and the market model
estimated return; the market model coefficients are estimated on the 200-day period (days 2220
through 221) prior to the event day; the CRSP Value-Weighted Return Index is the market return proxy

there is an industry effect lag (from the event stocks to the rivals) and it differs for small
and large cap stocks, it should be more pronounced for the small cap stocks as they have
greater transactions costs and are followed by fewer analysts; likewise, to the extent that
there is a feedback response from the rivals to the event firms, it should be more
pronounced for the small cap stocks.
Small cap stocks are followed by fewer analysts in part because:
.
institutions invest primarily in large cap stocks due to liquidity and regulatory
constraints;
.
institutions are a large part of the demand for stock price information that is met
by analysts (Hodgson et al., 2003; Atiase, 1985); and
.
private information is more noticeable in thinly traded stocks (Atiase, 1985).
Because small cap stocks are less analyzed, information dissemination is more gradual
regarding them. Ayers and Freeman (2000) finds that small cap stock prices lag large
cap stock prices with respect to industry-wide information, while Martikainen et al.
(1995) find that large cap stock prices lead small cap stock prices generally.
Third (to our knowledge, for the first time), we study the event firm’s stock’s
performance relative to its industry rivals in both the Cox and Peterson (1994) [þ 1, þ 3]
and [þ 4, þ 20] periods. The existing literature only looks at the event firm’s stock’s
performance relative to the market (e.g. the S&P 500); this is a less preferred indirect
approach.
Fourth, we examine whether the post-event abnormal stock returns (for the event
firms, their rivals, and the rival-event firm return differential) can be explained by prior
variables. While the intra-industry effects literature has analyzed which factors
determine whether the contagion or competitive effect dominates for the
event-contemporaneous period (i.e. essentially day [0]), it has not examined the factors
that effect the rivals’ stocks’ ARs over the extended Cox and Peterson (1994) periods:
[þ 1, þ 3] and [þ 4, þ 20]. Specifically, we test whether two event firm and two industry
pre-event variables predict the post-event AR for day þ 1 (AR[þ 1]) and the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) in the Cox and Peterson (1994) periods: [þ 1, þ 3] and
[þ 4, þ 20]. The two event firm pre-event variables are net sales market share
(MKTSHR) and the stock return correlation with its rivals’ stock return (CORR). The two
industry pre-event variables are the degree of industry concentration as measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the industry average stock return standard
deviation (AVGSTD). Additionally, we use the event firm pre-event through event
period (i.e. [2 20, 0]) CAR as a fifth explanatory variable (denoted PRECAR, which is
succinct but slightly misleading since it also includes the event).
Lang and Stulz (1992) found that CORR, HHI, and financial leverage help explain
intra-industry effects. We use MKTSHR as a measure of the event firm’s leadership
(and/or size) and, as in Slovin et al. (1991) and Laux et al. (1998), presume that when the
event firm is the industry leader, the intra-industry effect will be magnified. As in
Akhigbe and Madura (2008), we use AVGSTD rather than leverage as an explanatory
variable because it reflects both operating and financial leverage. Additionally, we test
whether the event stock’s pre-event through event CAR is negatively related to the
post-event ARs (as is implied by the overreaction hypothesis).
Like Cox and Peterson (1994), we test whether the event stock’s post-event AR
is negatively related to the PRECAR (as is implied by the overreaction hypothesis)
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and negatively related to the MKTSHR (as found by Cox and Peterson, 1994, using a
SIZE variable similar to our MKTSHR variable). Additionally, we test whether the event
stock’s post-event AR is related to CORR (the closer the event firm and its rivals are, the
more likely a lagged event firm response is coincident with a lagged intra-industry
effect). Likewise, the event stock’s post-event AR may be related to HHI and AVGSTD
since when the industry is concentrated and high risk, the bad news is magnified.
Our data show that the event firms’ stock prices fall about 13 percent on the event day,
while their rivals’ stock prices fall roughly only about a 30th as much (roughly 0.4 percent).
Moreover, much of the rivals’ stocks’ price fall is delayed for up to a couple days (less so for
the large cap stocks than for the small cap stocks since the large cap stocks are followed
more closely by analysts). In part, the rivals’ stock prices presumably fall much less than
the event firms’ stock prices because there are many rivals for each event stock. While the
average rivals’ stock price drop is a small percentage (roughly 0.4 percent), due to the
numbers of rivals, the $ effect on the industry can be very large. This prompts a feedback
response upon the event firms’ stocks that can be competitive for a couple days [þ1, þ 3]
(mostly noticed for small cap stocks), but is magnified, gradual and a contagion over the
longer [þ4, þ 20] period for which the event firms’ stocks decline an additional
0.8-1.8 percent (again less so for the large cap stocks than for the small cap stocks since
the large cap stocks are followed more closely by analysts). The gradualness may be
explained by the numbers of the rivals’ stock prices that are feeding back onto the event
firm’s stock price and the smaller rivals’ stock price drop (i.e. less discernable signal) that is
precipitating the feedback to the event firm’s stock price (roughly 0.4 percent rather than
the event firm’s initial 13 percent). The magnification is due to the numbers of the rivals’
stock prices that are feeding back onto the event firm’s stock price. Thus, while we observe
the event firm’s resumed stock price drop in the [þ4, þ 20] period that was observed in
Cox and Peterson (1994), we provide an intra-industry effects and feedback explanation.
This explanation is bolstered by the fact that the event firm’s CAR[þ4, þ 20] is better the:
smaller the event, smaller the event firm’s pre-event market share, more correlated the
event firm and rivals’ stock prices in the pre-event period, less concentrated the industry
and less risky the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our data and
methodology. Section III presents our empirical results and Section IV concludes.
II. Data and methodology
A. Data
We examine daily stock returns around one-day price declines of 10 percent or more for
event stocks and their rivals. Daily returns from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) for all S&P 500 (large cap) and S&P 600 (small cap) member firms in the
COMPUSTAT S&P index member database are analyzed. Our sample consists of all
events for:
.
S&P 500 member firms from January 1973 through December 2006; and
.
S&P 600 member firms from January 1995 through December 2006.
We define a firm’s industry by its COMPUSTAT four-digit SIC code. An event firm’s
rivals are the firms from the same S&P index as the event firm that have the event firm’s
four-digit SIC code.

Using techniques similar to those used in Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Cox and
Peterson (1994), we include event stocks whose prices are at least $10 per share prior to
the event to reduce the possible price reversal induced by bid-ask price bounce.
We exclude stocks whose prices were based on bid-ask averages because it is unclear
that an investor could transact at such prices. In addition, we exclude the entire industry
for any day when the industry has multiple stocks that had price declines of 10 percent or
more to avoid industry-wide price movements. For each event stock, we form an equally
weighted portfolio of all its rival firms’ stocks (those of the same COMPUSTAT SIC
code, as in Lang and Stulz, 1992) and calculate its daily CRSP return.
Among the S&P 500 member firms between 1973 and 2006, there are 7,948
occurrences of a stock having a one-day price decline of 10 percent or more. About half of
them (4,055 occurrences) occur in the 1995 through 2006 sub-period. The number of
events initially reduced to 5,163 (and 2,948 for the 1995-2006 sub-period) as 20 of these
stocks have prices calculated from bid-ask averages and 2,765 stocks had initial prices
smaller than $10. In addition, we exclude 1,283 occurrences due to multiple stocks from
the same industry having same day events and 768 occurrences for which no rival
portfolio can be constructed. This leaves us with 3,112 event stocks (or 39.15 percent of
the initial 7,948 event stocks) in our final sample (and 1,871 event stocks (or 46.14 percent
of the initial 4,055) for the 1995-2006 sub-period). Among the S&P 600 member firms, we
start with a total of 11,218 occurrences of a one-day stock price decline of 10 percent or
more between 1995 and 2006 and end up with 4,096 event stocks (or 36.51 percent of the
initial 11,218) in our final sample. We excluded 5,258 stocks (two stocks because their
prices came from bid-ask averages and 5,256 stocks that had initial prices smaller
than $10). We also excluded 1,045 stocks due to multiple stocks from the same industry
dropping at least 10 percent in price on the same day and 819 stocks because they had
no rivals.
B. Daily abnormal stock returns around an event
As is typical for the literature (Akhigbe and Madura, 2008), the stock daily AR is
calculated as the difference between the actual daily stock return and the estimated stock
return based on the market model estimated over a 200-trading-day pre-event period
[2 220, 2 21]. The event day, denoted [0], is the day with at least 10 percent stock price
decline. The daily AR of each event firm i for each day t in the [2 20, þ 20] period is
calculated as:
ARi;t ¼ Ri;t 2 ðai þ b*1 Rm;t Þ

ð1Þ

where:
ARi,t ¼ the daily abnormal stock return of event firm i on day t.
Ri,t

¼ the actual stock return for event firm i on day t.

Rm,t

¼ the daily stock return on the CRSP value-weighted index market return on
day t.

ai, bi ¼ firm i’s market model parameters based on the pre-event period
[2 220, 2 21].
The daily abnormal stock return for the event firm i’s rivals’ portfolio for each day t in
the event period [2 20, þ 20] is computed as:
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ARi’s_rivals,t

¼ event firm i’s rivals’ stock portfolio’s AR on day t.

Ri’s_rivals,t

¼ event firm i’s rivals’ stock portfolio’s equally weighted return
on day t.

ai’s_rivals, bi’s_rivals ¼ event firm i’s rivals’ stock portfolio’s market model
parameters based on the [2 220, 2 21] period.
CARs for each stock are formed by aggregating its individual daily stock ARs.
Denoting the large price decline event day as day 0, we examine:
.
the ARs of 41 trading days: day 2 20 through day þ 20;
.
the CARs for day þ 1 through day þ 3; and
.
the CAR from day þ 4 through day þ 20.
Cross-sectional average ARs and CARs are calculated and tested for statistical
significance. Two-tailed t-tests are conducted to test the significance of cross-sectional
averages of the event stocks, the rivals’ stock portfolios, and the differences between
the rivals’ stock portfolios’ and the event stocks’ ARs and CARs. We also determine the
proportion with positive ARs for each.
C. The relation between the post-event stock ARs and prior variables
Here, we examine whether the post-event abnormal stock returns for the event firm and
its rivals can be explained by prior event firm and industry variables. Specifically, the
post-event AR[þ 1] and CARs ([þ 1, þ 3] and [þ 4, þ 20]) for the event firms, their rivals
and the rivals’-event firms’ return differential are cross-sectionally regressed on the:
.
event firm’s pre-event through event CAR;
.
event firm’s pre-event market share;
.
pre-event correlation between the event firm’s stock returns and its rivals’ stock
portfolios’ returns;
.
pre-event industry market concentration; and
.
pre-event industry average stock return standard deviation to determine the
relationship between these variables and the post-event AR and CARs.
According to the overreaction hypothesis, the overreaction should be greater, the greater
the event. Similarly, as argued by Akhigbe and Madura (2008), if negative news by a firm
has an intra-industry impact (either contagion or competitive), this effect should be
larger when the information magnitude is greater. In this paper, we use the event firm
pre-event through event period (i.e. [2 20, 0]) CAR (denoted as PRECAR which is
succinct but slightly misleading since it also includes the event) to represent the
magnitude of the negative information.
An event firm’s market share (MKTSHR) is measured as the ratio of the event firm’s
net sales to the industry’s combined net sales in the four quarters prior to the event day.
News regarding the industry leader (where the leader is determined in terms of net sales)

is hypothesized to have greater information content regarding the rival firms’ stock
prices than news regarding non-leaders.
Lang and Stulz (1992) and Akhigbe and Madura (2008) argue that an event
concerning a single firm is more likely to affect other firms if the event firm is closely
related to the other firms. We use the pre-event stock return correlation coefficient
(CORR) between the event firm and its rivals, measured for day 2 220 through day 2 21,
to proxy the relatedness between the event firm and its rivals.
Lang and Stulz (1992) consider the industry market concentration as a key
intra-industry effect factor. They argue that the more concentrated the industry, the
greater the event’s effect on the rivals’ stock prices. They measure the degree of
concentration by the HHI, where low numbers indicate that the industry is more
competitive. It is constructed from the net sales prior to the event day for all the industry
members by summing the squares of the percentage market shares held by each firm.
We adopt the same technique to measure the industry market concentration and
examine its relationship with the post-event AR and CARs.
With the belief that stock returns in more risky industries are more affected by
information, we adopt the industry average stock return standard deviation (AVGSTD)
to proxy risk for the industry. Lang and Stulz (1992) find that higher financial leverage
results in contagion.
For the event firm, according to the overreaction hypothesis, the post-event AR
should be negatively related to the PRECAR variable. Cox and Peterson (1994) find that
the CAR[þ 1, þ 3] is negatively related to a size variable (which should be similar to our
MKTSHR variable); they argue that this relationship is due a liquidity effect where
small cap stocks have greater bid-ask spreads and the liquidity effect disappears in
the post-October 1987 because the markets became liquid. They also find that the
CAR[þ 4, þ 20] is unrelated to their size variable, but is positively related to the
PRECAR variable (longer-run under reaction).
We run six versions (one for each of the six following dependent variables:
AR[þ 1] rivals,
CAR[þ 1, þ 3] eventfirm ,
CAR[þ 1, þ 3] rivals,
AR[þ 1] eventfirm ,
CAR[þ 4, þ 20]eventfirm and CAR[þ 4, þ 20]rivals) of the following regression model,
where the regression equations differ only in the dependent variable:
Dependent variable ¼ a þ b1 PRECAR þ b2 MKTSHR þ b3 CORR
þ b4 HHI þ b5 AVGSTD þ 1

ð3Þ

where:
PRECAR

¼ the event firm 21 day [2 20, 0] market model AR. It could less
succinctly but more accurately be denoted as the pre-event through
event CAR.

MKTSHR

¼ the ratio of the event firm’s net sales to its industry’s net sales in the
four quarters prior to the event day.

CORR

¼ the pre-event [2 220, 2 21] correlation between the event firm’s
stock return and its rivals’ stock portfolio’s return.

HHI

¼ the pre-event Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the event firm’s
industry.

Abnormal stock
returns

159

MF
37,2

AVGSTD

¼ the event firm’s pre-event [2 220, 2 21] industry average stock
return standard deviation.

bj for j ¼ 1-5 ¼ parameters to be estimated.

1

160

¼ error term.

III. Empirical results
A. Stock ARs around an event
Table I shows the stock ARs for each day from day -20 through day þ20 for the S&P 500
event stocks and their rivals’ portfolios between 1973 and 2006 (i.e. for the full period).
It also shows the CARs for the day þ1 through day þ3 and day þ4 through day þ20
periods. On the event day (day 0), the event stocks have an average AR of 212.4665
percent and their rivals have a much less negative, though statistically significant, AR
of 20.5143 percent (while the event stocks AR is about 24 times that of their rivals,
i.e. 12.4665/0.5143, the overall $ impact on the rivals can exceed that on the event firm
depending on the number and sizes of the rivals). Thus, the contagion effect dominates the
competitive effect. Further evidence of the contagion effect dominance is the fact that
more than 60 percent of the time, the rivals’ stock portfolios’ have a negative event-day AR.
The event stocks’ average AR is negative in all 20 pre-event days and 13 of them are
statistically significant at least at the 90 percent confidence level. While the rivals’
portfolios’ average AR is positive for some and negative for other pre-event days, the
rivals’ portfolios’ average AR is statistically significantly negative in four out of the five
days immediately prior to the event day. There is a close industry association (contagion)
in the week prior to the large price decline event day.
Event stocks experience an average AR on day þ 1 of 0.1717 percent (i.e. a stock price
reversal), which is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. However,
this statistically significant positive average one day AR does not continue. The event
stocks’ average CARs are a statistically insignificant 0.1865 percent for the [þ 1, þ 3]
period but a statistically significant 2 0.8217 percent for the [þ 4, þ 20] period. The
rivals’ stock portfolios’ have a statistically significant negative average CAR (lagged
contagion) of 2 0.1384 percent for the [þ 1, þ 3] period which is mainly due to
the 2 0.1769 percent average AR on day þ 1. The observation that the contagion (from
the event stock to its rivals) is lagged is due to the fact that the event firms’ AR[0] is more
than 60 times larger than its AR in any of the three following days (that correspond to the
rivals’ statistically significant CAR[þ 1, þ 3]. The event firm’s resumed poor
CAR[þ 4, þ 20] puzzled Cox and Peterson (1994); our data suggest that there is a
feedback response (from the rivals’ stocks to the event firms’ stocks) that is magnified,
gradual, and a contagion over the [þ 4, þ 20] period for which the event firms’ stocks
decline an additional 0.8217 percent. The gradualness may be explained by the numbers
of the rivals’ stock prices that are feeding back onto the event firm’s stock price and the
smaller rivals’ stock price drop (i.e. less discernable signal) that is precipitating the
feedback (roughly 0.5143 percent rather than the event firm’s initial 12.4665 percent)
to the event stock. The magnification is due to the numbers of the rivals’ stock prices that
are feeding back onto the event firm’s stock price. Unlike for the event stocks, the rivals’
portfolio’s AR is positive and insignificant (it is 0.0431 percent) for the [þ 4, þ 20] period.
Thus, the dominance of the contagion effect (from the event firm’s stock price to its
rivals’ stocks’ prices) over the competitive effect only extends for the three

post-event days. Finally, the rivals’ stocks perform statistically significantly worse than
the event stocks for the [þ 1, þ 3] period, but statistically significantly better than the
event stocks for the [þ 4, þ 20] period.
Table II shows the results for the S&P 500 event stocks and their rivals’ stock
portfolios for the 1995-2006 sub-period. The event day and pre-event day results are
generally similar in direction and magnitude to those in Table I. The event firms’
stocks and their rivals’ stocks exhibit statistically significant negative average one day
ARs in four out of the five days immediately prior to the event day, i.e. there is strong
industry stock price comovement (contagion) in the week prior to and on the day of the
event stock’s large price decline. As in Table I, the event stocks statistically
significantly underperform (both relative to the market and their rivals) in the
[þ 4, þ 20] period.
Slight differences between the results in Tables I and II occur in the post-event
period. In Table II, the average AR on day þ 1 is not significantly different from zero for
either the event stock (there is no overreaction) or its rivals. Also in Table II, the rivals’
portfolio does not exhibit a statistically significant negative AR for the [þ 1, þ 3]
period, instead, it exhibits a statistically insignificant gain (i.e. the competitive effect
slightly dominates the contagion effect). Finally, in the [þ 1, þ 3] period, the rivals did
statistically significantly worse than the event stocks for Table I, whereas the opposite
held for Table II. It appears that in the more recent and shorter period (1995-2006
presented in Table II, for which the stock markets were presumably more efficient),
while the rivals CAR[0, 3] (approximately AR[0] þ CAR[þ 1, þ 3]) was essentially the
same as for the (1973-2006) period, all of it occurred on the event day, whereas more of it
occurred in the [þ 1, þ 3] period (i.e. was lagged) for the (1973-1994) years. As a
consequence, the feedback from the rivals to the event firms began immediately
(and there was no temporary event stock reversal) in Table II.
Table III shows the results for the S&P 600 (i.e. small cap) event stocks and their
rivals’ stock portfolios between 1995 and 2006 (thus, their contemporaneous analogs
are the S&P 500, large cap, results in Table II). In the pre-event period, eight of the 20
S&P 600 event stock negative average ARs are statistically significant at the 90 percent
confidence level. Somewhat more slowly than for the large cap stocks, it is only in the
three-day period immediately preceding the event that the rivals’ stock portfolios’ ARs
are consistently negative and significant. On the event day (day 0), the event stocks have
an average AR of 2 13.9591 percent (which is 1 percent lower than the S&P 500 event
stocks’ AR as seen in Table II), while the rivals’ stock portfolios’ 2 0.1266 percent
average AR is less negative than the 2 0.7530 percent experienced by the S&P 500 rivals’
stock portfolio. Notably, the event stock’s AR[0] is more than 100 times that of their
rivals, i.e. 13.9591/0.1266; this ratio is roughly six times larger than it was for the
large cap stock (12.9532/0.753), which suggests that the small cap rivals
event-contemporaneous response is much smaller than that for the large cap stocks.
Also, the 45.2 percent positive AR[0]s for the S&P 600 rivals’ portfolios, is not as small as
the 36.1 percent for the S&P 500 rivals’ portfolios.
The short-term post-event reversal documented by Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and
studied in Cox and Peterson (1994) is statistically significant for the S&P 600 event
stocks. It did not disappear for the post-October 1987 period as Cox and Peterson (1994)
argued. Event stockholders on day þ 1 experience an average return of 0.6215 percent,
which is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level and is higher than
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Table II.
Abnormal stock returns
around large stock price
decline (i.e. event) days
(for 1,871 events of S&P
500 stocks from 1995
through 2006)

Event firms’ abnormal stock Rivals portfolios’ abnormal
Rivals portfolios’
return (AR)
stock return (AR)
AR 2 event stocks’ AR
Average (%) Positive (%) Average (%) Positive (%) Average (%) Positive (%)

2 20
20.1059
2 19
20.1191
2 18
20.1645 * *
2 17
20.2344 * * *
2 16
20.1453 *
2 15
20.1123
2 14
20.1154
2 13
20.2623 * * *
2 12
20.2385 * * *
2 11
20.1688 * *
2 10
20.1499 *
29
20.1698 *
28
20.1599 *
27
20.2172 * *
26
20.0078
25
20.1720 *
24
20.2299 * *
23
20.1003
22
20.1876 *
21
20.7471 * * *
0
212.9532 * * *
1
20.0379
2
20.1140
3
20.1232
4
0.0181
5
20.1180
6
20.0999
7
20.1329
8
0.0683
9
20.0955
10
20.0138
11
20.0620
12
20.0250
13
20.1273
14
0.0224
15
20.1667 *
16
20.0972
17
0.1039
18
0.0671
19
0.0619
20
20.1526
1 through 3
20.3113
4 through 20 21.0751 * * *

47.4 * *
47.8 *
46.5 * * *
44.6 * * *
47.3 * *
46.0 * * *
47.7 * *
46.7 * * *
46.7 * * *
46.5 * * *
46.9 * * *
46.7 * * *
46.2 * * *
46.5 * * *
49.5
46.9 * * *
46.6 * * *
47.3 * *
45.5 * * *
42.1 * * *
0.5 * * *
51.7
48.7
47.5 * *
49.3
48.7
47.5 * *
46.6 * * *
48.4
48.7
51.1
49.7
49.6
48.0 *
49.3
46.9 * * *
48.9
50.0
49.9
48.9
46.7 * * *
48.6
45.5 * * *

20.0932 *
0.0140
0.3780 * * *
20.0604
20.1566 * * *
20.3031 * * *
20.0831
0.1191 * *
0.2029 * * *
0.1460 * *
0.0806
20.0217
0.1117 * *
0.0393
0.1723 * * *
20.1823 * * *
20.1474 * * *
0.0274
20.1012 *
20.2227 * * *
20.7530 * * *
20.0695
0.1951 * * *
20.0190
20.0470
20.0902
20.0120
0.1799 * * *
20.0450
20.0495
0.1694 * * *
0.0217
0.1589 * * *
20.0774
0.1976 * * *
20.0843
20.2482 * * *
0.2673 * * *
0.2407 * * *
20.1760 * * *
20.1231 * *
0.0992
0.1680

46.4 * * *
50.4
53.6 * * *
47.9 *
46.0 * * *
42.3 * * *
46.7 * * *
51.8
52.9 * *
52.8 * *
51.2
51.1
52.1 *
51.4
54.8 * * *
45.3 * * *
45.7 * * *
48.7
48.5
46.3 * * *
36.1 * * *
49.4
51.4
49.0
47.1 * *
47.0 * * *
50.8
50.7
48.7
47.3 * *
52.8 * *
50.7
52.5 * *
48.6
49.2
47.7 * *
43.7 * * *
52.2 *
51.6
46.4 * * *
48.0 *
49.6
50.0

0.0127
0.1331
0.5425 * * *
0.1740 * *
2 0.0113
2 0.1908 * *
0.0323
0.3814 * * *
0.4414 * * *
0.3148 * * *
0.2305 * *
0.1481
0.2717 * * *
0.2565 * * *
0.1800 *
2 0.0103
0.0825
0.1277
0.0864
0.5245 * * *
12.2002 * * *
2 0.0317
0.3091 * *
0.1042
2 0.0651
0.0278
0.0879
0.3128 * * *
2 0.1133
0.0460
0.1832 *
0.0837
0.1839 *
0.0499
0.1752 *
0.0824
2 0.1509
0.1634
0.1736 *
2 0.2378 * *
0.0295
0.4106 * *
1.2431 * * *

50.2
52.7 * *
54.1 * * *
52.4 * *
50.0
48.6
50.0
53.6 * * *
54.6 * * *
53.7 * * *
53.6 * * *
53.6 * * *
53.8 * * *
53.6 * * *
52.9 * *
50.7
51.4
52.0 *
52.4 * *
56.5 * * *
99.7 * * *
48.1 *
51.0
50.4
50.7
51.3
51.0
53.3 * * *
50.0
51.3
50.6
50.8
49.8
50.8
50.1
53.0 * * *
47.8 *
52.2 *
51.1
48.8
50.0
0.5211 *
0.5468 * * *

Notes: Significance at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels (two-tailed test); each event stock has an at least
10 percent event-day stock price drop (i.e. the event-day return is # 2 10 percent); its rival portfolio is
equally weighted and is composed of the indexes’ other stocks that have its SIC; the daily abnormal stock
return on day t (where t ¼ 220 to þ20) is the difference between the actual return and the market model
estimated return; the market model coefficients are estimated on the 200-day period (days 2220 through
2 21) prior to the event day; the CRSP Value-Weighted Return Index is the market return proxy

Day

Event firms’ abnormal stock Rivals portfolios’ abnormal
Rivals portfolios’
return (AR)
stock return (AR)
AR 2 event stocks’ AR
Average (%) Positive (%) Average (%) Positive (%) Average (%) Positive (%)

220
20.1841 * * *
219
20.1111
218
20.0520
217
20.0461
216
20.0897
215
20.0748
214
20.0521
213
20.1262 * *
212
20.0858
211
20.1298 *
210
20.1407 * *
29
20.0598
28
20.0640
27
20.2054 * * *
26
20.1161 *
25
20.0549
24
20.0453
23
20.2420 * *
22
20.0563
21
20.2386 * *
0
213.9591 * * *
1
0.6215 * * *
2
0.1361
3
20.0927
4
0.0036
5
0.0170
6
20.0639
7
20.1985 * *
8
20.2305 * * *
9
20.0946
10
20.1192
11
0.0119
12
20.0891
13
20.0703
14
20.0717
15
20.0985
16
20.1150
17
20.1219 *
18
20.0489
19
20.1169
20
20.1423 * *
1 through 3
0.6052 * * *
4 through 20 21.7889 * * *

45.6 * * *
47.2 * * *
47.0 * * *
46.5 * * *
46.5 * * *
47.7 * * *
46.9 * * *
46.9 * * *
47.5 * * *
46.5 * * *
47.5 * * *
47.3 * * *
47.1 * * *
45.2 * * *
46.4 * * *
46.4 * * *
45.6 * * *
44.3 * * *
45.7 * * *
44.4 * * *
0.1 * * *
53.8 * * *
48.6 *
46.8 * * *
48.2 * *
47.9 * * *
46.8 * * *
45.9 * * *
45.7 * * *
47.2 * * *
47.3 * * *
48.4 * *
45.9 * * *
48.2 * *
47.4 * * *
47.9 * * *
47.0 * * *
46.4 * * *
46.6 * * *
47.4 * * *
45.7 * * *
52.3 * * *
44.0 * * *

2 0.0744 *
0.0482
0.3904 * * *
0.0865 * *
2 0.1320 * * *
2 0.2071 * * *
2 0.1267 * * *
0.0156
0.1419 * * *
0.1369 * * *
0.1159 * * *
0.2406 * * *
0.2616 * * *
0.0324
0.0458
0.0144
2 0.0233
2 0.1032 * * *
2 0.1256 * * *
2 0.1769 * * *
2 0.1266 * * *
2 0.1730 * * *
0.0440
2 0.0486
2 0.1440 * * *
2 0.1152 * * *
2 0.0137
0.1643 * * *
2 0.0545
2 0.1111 * * *
0.0604
2 0.0399
2 0.0084
2 0.0975 * * *
0.2617 * * *
0.0383
2 0.2269 * * *
0.1709 * * *
0.3289 * * *
2 0.2377 * * *
2 0.0661 *
2 0.1885 * * *
2 0.1222

46.0 * * *
49.9
54.3 * * *
51.6 * *
46.4 * * *
44.2 * * *
47.4 * * *
52.3 * * *
51.9 * *
52.2 * * *
48.1 * *
54.5 * * *
54.4 * * *
51.2
49.5
49.6
47.9 * * *
46.1 * * *
48.5 *
48.3 * *
45.2 * * *
45.6 * * *
50.7
47.9 * * *
45.6 * * *
46.0 * * *
47.8 * * *
53.0 * * *
46.0 * * *
47.0 * * *
50.5
49.5
48.4 * *
47.1 * * *
51.8 * *
49.4
44.2 * * *
49.7
55.6 * * *
43.8 * * *
47.9 * * *
48.4 * *
48.8

0.1098
0.1593 * *
0.4424 * * *
0.1326 *
20.0423
20.1322
20.0746
0.1418 * *
0.2277 * * *
0.2668 * * *
0.2567 * * *
0.3004 * * *
0.3256 * * *
0.2378 * * *
0.1620 * *
0.0693
0.0219
0.1388
20.0694
0.0617
13.8325 * * *
20.7945 * * *
20.0921
0.0441
20.1476 *
20.1322 *
0.0502
0.3628 * * *
0.1760 * *
20.0166
0.1796 * *
20.0518
0.0808
20.0272
0.3334 * * *
0.1368 *
20.1119
0.2928 * * *
0.3778 * * *
20.1208
0.0762
20.7937 * * *
1.6667 * * *

51.5 *
52.9 * * *
55.1 * * *
52.8 * * *
50.8
48.4 * *
50.7
52.5 * * *
53.7 * * *
53.9 * * *
51.8 * *
54.0 * * *
54.0 * * *
53.6 * * *
53.3 * * *
52.7 * * *
52.7 * * *
53.6 * * *
52.6 * * *
53.7 * * *
99.9 * * *
45.1 * * *
50.8
52.1 * * *
49.3
49.6
51.8 * *
53.7 * * *
52.5 * * *
52.1 * * *
52.8 * * *
50.6
52.2 * * *
49.8
53.1 * * *
51.6 * *
49.1
53.2 * * *
55.0 * * *
49.4
51.9 * *
0.4664 * * *
0.5485 * * *

Notes: Significance at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels (two-tailed test); each event stock has an at least
10 percent event-day stock price drop (i.e. the event-day return is , 210 percent); its rival portfolio is
equally weighted and is composed of the indexes’ other stocks that have its SIC; the daily abnormal stock
return on day t (where t ¼ 2 20 to þ 20) is the difference between the actual return and the market model
estimated return; the market model coefficients are estimated on the 200-day period (days 2220
through 221) prior to the event day; the CRSP Value-Weighted Return Index is the market return proxy
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the 0.1717 percent (as seen in Table I) and the 2 0.0379 (as seen in Table II) for the S&P
500 event stocks. The event firm’s AR[1] and CAR[þ 1, þ 3] represents a cumulative
gradual response to the event and feedback from the rivals’ response (there may be some
residual bid-ask price bounce effect as well). Also potentially anomalous, the S&P 600
event stock [þ 4, þ 20] period CAR is a statistically significant 2 1.7889 percent (as seen
in Table III), which is more negative than that for the S&P 500 event stocks (as seen in
Tables I and II); this too represents a cumulative gradual response to the event and a
feedback response from the rivals’ response.
Most of the S&P 600 rivals’ response to the event is lagged. As noted earlier, the S&P
600 rivals’ stock portfolios’ average AR[0] was 2 0.1266 percent (roughly only a fifth of
that for the S&P 500 rivals shown in Table II). The S&P 600 rivals’ stock portfolios
continue to experience a significantly negative average CAR of 2 0.1885 percent in the
[þ 1, þ 3] period (while the event stocks have a contemporaneous significantly positive
average CAR). While the [þ 1, þ 3] period intra-industry effect could be interpreted as a
contemporaneous competitive effect, this interpretation seems less plausible than
interpreting the effect as a lagged contagion effect given that the event firm’s AR[0] is
about 20 times as large as its CAR[þ 1, þ 3], i.e. 13.9591/0.6052. The S&P 600 rivals’
CAR continues to be negative (2 0.1222 percent) in the [þ 4, þ 20] period. Thus, the
industry contagion effect (from the event firm to its rivals) seems to be more gradual and
longer lasting for the S&P 600 stocks than for the S&P 500 stocks. As with the S&P 500
stocks, the S&P 600 rivals’ portfolio does not exhibit statistically a significant AR for the
[þ 4, þ 20] period. Interestingly, if one were to calculate CAR[0, 20] for the event firms
and for their rivals, then divide the event firms’ CAR[0, 20] by that for their rivals, the
ratios would be around 30 for each table (though a bit larger for the small cap firms as
may be expected). This taken together with the earlier observation that this ratio based
on AR[0], was more than six times higher for the small cap stocks, suggests while the
small cap response is delayed, the cumulative response over the [0, 20] period is similar.
Based on the average ARs in Tables II and III, the average CARs for the:
.
event stocks;
.
rivals’ stock portfolios; and
.
difference between the event stocks and their rivals’ stock portfolios are
portrayed in Figures 1 and 2.
In Figure 1, the S&P 500 event stocks begin with a 2 3.7419 percent average CAR at
day 2 1 before it falls to 2 16.2104 percent at day 0 and reaches its minimum of
2 17.1315 percent at day þ 16. The S&P 500 rivals’ stock portfolios’ average CAR in
Figure 1 does not go beyond ^ 1 percent for the entire 41-day period. It reaches its peak at
0.5451 percent on day 2 6 and its trough at 2 0.9045 percent on day þ 1. The excess of
the rivals’ stock portfolios’ CAR over the event stocks’ CAR generally rises throughout
the entire period with more than half the rise occurring on the event day.
In Figure 2, the S&P 600 event stocks begin with a 2 2.1529 percent average CAR
through day 2 1 before it falls to 2 15.8115 percent through day 0 and falls to
2 16.5550 percent through day þ 20. The S&P 600 rivals stock portfolios’ average CAR
in Figure 2 (like that for the S&P 500 rivals shown in Figure 1) also does not go beyond
^ 1 percent for the entire 41-day period. It reaches its peak at 0.9930 percent on day 2 5
and its trough at 2 0.1057 percent on day þ 13. The excess of the rivals’ stock
portfolios’ CAR over the event stocks’ CAR generally rises throughout the entire period
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Figure 1.
Average cumulative
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from market model (%)
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(though not as consistently as for the S&P 500 stocks) with more than half the rise
occurring on the event day.
B. The relation between the post-event ARs and the prior variables
Table IV shows the relation between the prior variables and the post-event AR (and
CARs) for the S&P 500 event stocks (Panel A), their rivals’ stock portfolios (Panel B),
and the differential between the two (Panel C) from 1973 through 2006. We begin with
the event stocks’ regressions (Panel A). None of the explanatory variables’ coefficients
are significant in the AR[þ 1] and CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regressions. However, the PRECAR,
MKTSHR, and CORR (AVGSTD) coefficients are positive (negative) and statistically
significant in the CAR[þ 4, þ 20] regression. They suggest that the event stock’s
CAR[þ 4, þ 20] is worse:

Figure 2.
Average cumulative
abnormal stock returns
from market model (%)
around at least 10 percent
stock price drop (i.e. event)
days (S&P 600 stocks,
1995-2006)
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Table IV.
Regression analysis of
cumulative residuals of
event stocks and rival
portfolios on event stock
and industry
characteristics – S&P
500 Universe (1973-2006)

AR [þ 1]
Coefficient
p-value

CAR [þ1, þ 3]
Coefficient
p-value

CAR [þ 4, þ 20]
Coefficient
p-value

Panel A: dependent variable: event firm’s post-event market model AR and CARs
Intercept
0.0046
0.2144
0.0084
0.1072
0.0046
PRECAR
0.0026
0.6414
0.0039
0.6278
0.0472
MKTSHR
20.0002
0.9873
0.0138
0.5212
0.0631
CORR
20.0036
0.5354
20.0022
0.7919
0.0387
HHI
20.0018
0.9253
20.0222
0.4031
2 0.0451
AVGSTD
20.0338
0.7093
20.2070
0.1070
2 1.0227
Sample size
3,070
3,070
3,070
F-stat.
0.2131
0.9571
0.9699
0.4347
11.6144
Panel B: dependent variable: rival portfolio’s post-event market model AR and CARs
Intercept
20.0020
0.2353
20.0023
0.4166
0.0152
PRECAR
20.0014
0.5837
20.0026
0.5415
0.0260
MKTSHR
20.0068
0.3231
20.0007
0.9533
2 0.0415
CORR
20.0037
0.1542
20.0079
0.0727 *
0.0025
HHI
20.0023
0.7851
20.0218
0.1244
0.0517
AVGSTD
0.1082
0.0080 * * *
0.2030
0.0032 * * *
2 0.2535
Sample size
3,070
3,070
3,070
F-stat.
6.0594
0.0000 * * *
8.5119
0.0000 * * *
2.9688
Panel C: dependent variable: rival portfolio’s 2 event firm’s
Intercept
20.0065
0.0885 *
20.0106
0.0496 * *
0.0106
PRECAR
20.0040
0.4945
20.0065
0.4357
2 0.0212
MKTSHR
20.0065
0.6813
20.0145
0.5184
2 0.1045
CORR
20.0001
0.9845
20.0057
0.5027
2 0.0362
HHI
20.0005
0.9781
0.0003
0.9906
0.0967
AVGSTD
0.1420
0.1333
0.4100
0.0022 * * *
0.7692
Sample size
3,070
3,070
3,070
F-stat.
1.1900
0.3114
3.5269
0.0035 * * *
8.3730

0.5973
0.0003 * * *
0.0773 *
0.0046 * * *
0.3055
0.0000 * * *
0.0000 * * *
0.0067 * * *
0.0023 * * *
0.0734 *
0.7806
0.0704 *
0.0668 *
0.0112 * *
0.2312
0.1186
0.0044 * * *
0.0099 * * *
0.0326 * *
0.0005 * * *
0.0000 * * *

Notes: Significance at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels; the event stocks include one-day price drops
of 10 percent or more between January 1973 and December 2006 of S&P 500 Index constituents; rival
portfolios are equally weighted portfolios with S&P 500 Index constituents with same four-digit SIC
code of the event stock; PRECAR is the 21-day (220, 0) market model cumulative residual and
MKTSHR is the pre-event percentage of industry sales of the event stock; CORR measures the
pre-event (2 220, 221) return correlation between event stock and rival portfolio; HHI measures the
industry’s pre-event sales concentration and AVGSTD is the industry’s average standard deviation of
pre-event (2220, 2 21) daily returns
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the worse the event stock’s pre-event through event CAR, (opposite of what is
implied by the overreaction hypothesis);
the lower the event stock’s pre-event market share;
the lower the event stock’s pre-event return correlation with its rivals; and
the higher the pre-event industry average standard deviation.

Panel B shows that the PRECAR, HHI, MKTSHR, and AVGSTD coefficients are
statistically significant in the rivals’ stock portfolios’ CAR[þ 4, þ 20] regression; the
PRECAR and HHI coefficients are positive, while the MKTSHR and AVGSTD
coefficients are negative. Thus, the rivals’ CAR[þ 4, þ 20 is worse:

.
.
.
.

the
the
the
the

worse the event stock’s pre-event through event CAR;
lower the pre-event market concentration (HHI);
higher the event firm’s pre-event market share; and
higher the pre-event industry average standard deviation.

The CORR and AVGSTD are statistically significant for at least one of the other
regressions (AR[þ 1] or CAR[þ 1, þ 3]), but opposite in sign of what they were in
the CAR[þ 4, þ 20] regression; the rivals’ short-term post-event performance is worse
the: higher their pre-event return correlation with the event stocks and the lower the
pre-event industry average standard deviation.
Panel C shows the relation between the prior variables and the excess of the rival
portfolio’s return over that for the event firms. The rival-event firm return differential
is positively related to AVGSTD for both the [þ 1, þ 3] and [þ 4, þ 20] periods.
The rival-event firm return differential in the [þ 4, þ 20] period is also positively related
to the degree of industry concentration (HHI) but negatively related to the event firms’
market share (MKTSHR) and its pre-event stock return correlation (CORR) with that of
its rivals. The rivals’ performance relative the event firm in the post-event period
(primarily [þ 4, þ 20]) is better: the lower the event firm’s pre-event market share, the
lower their pre-event return correlation with the event stocks, the higher the pre-event
market concentration, and the higher the pre-event industry average standard deviation.
Since Panel C is essentially Panel B-Panel A, the Panel C coefficients that are statistically
significant tend to be the same as those in Panels A and B; moreover, their Panel C signs
tend to be the same as those in Panel B and opposite of those in Panel A, as expected.
Table V presents the relationships between the prior variables and the post-event
AR (and CARs) for the S&P 500 event stocks (Panel A), their rivals’ stock portfolios
(Panel B), and the return differential between rivals’ stock portfolio and event stock
(Panel C) between 1995 and 2006. These results are similar to, though generally weaker
than, those in Table IV (those for the longer, i.e. 1973-2006, period).
Table VI is the small cap stock analog (i.e. it shows the results for the S&P 600 stocks)
to Table V (which shows the results for the S&P 500 stocks). For the event firms’ stocks
(Panel A), these S&P 600 results are similar in sign and significance to (though
somewhat stronger than) the S&P 500 results in Tables IV and V. One difference is that
the S&P 600 PRECAR’s coefficient is negative and significant in the AR[þ 1] and
CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regressions (i.e. there is support for the overreaction hypothesis, though
we have a new explanation for why it occurs), whereas it was insignificant for the S&P
500 regressions. Also in the AR[þ 1] and CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regressions, the CORR
variable’s coefficient is negative and significant in the S&P 600 regressions, whereas it
was insignificant for the S&P 500 regressions. Finally, for the CAR[þ 4, þ 20]
regression; the S&P 600 CORR’s coefficient is insignificant whereas it was significant for
the S&P 500. Thus, for the S&P 600 event firms:
.
the worse the event stock’s pre-event through event CAR, the better its AR[þ 1]
and CAR[þ 1, þ 3] followed by a worse CAR[þ 4, þ 20];
.
the lower its pre-event market share, the lower its CAR[þ 4, þ 20];
.
the higher the pre-event return correlation with its rivals, the lower its post-event
AR[þ 1] and CAR[þ 1, þ 3];
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Table V.
Regression analysis of
cumulative residuals of
event stocks and rival
portfolios on event stock
and industry
characteristics – S&P
500 Universe (1995-2006)

AR [þ 1]
Coefficient
p-value

CAR [þ1, þ 3]
Coefficient
p-value

CAR [þ 4, þ 20]
Coefficient
p-value

Panel A: dependent variable: event firm’s post-event market model AR and CARs
Intercept
0.0025
0.6373
0.0007
0.9215
0.0019
PRECAR
2 0.0064
0.3611
20.0008
0.9382
0.0485
MKTSHR
2 0.0236
0.2610
20.0018
0.9524
0.0716
CORR
0.0010
0.8904
0.0052
0.6332
0.0602
HHI
0.0176
0.5104
20.0125
0.7467
20.0472
AVGSTD
2 0.0241
0.8269
20.1333
0.4025
21.2066
Sample size
1,854
1,854
1,854
F-stat.
0.8370
0.5233
0.4468
0.8158
10.5221
Panel B: dependent variable: rival portfolio’s post-event market model AR and CARs
Intercept
0.0005
0.8235
0.0058
0.1360
0.0146
PRECAR
0.0010
0.7245
20.0046
0.3825
0.0358
MKTSHR
2 0.0099
0.2655
20.0198
0.2080
0.0022
CORR
2 0.0059
0.0639 *
20.0139
0.0135 * *
0.0003
HHI
0.0076
0.5029
0.0049
0.8057
0.0077
AVGSTD
0.0830
0.0764
0.1164
0.1583
20.2579
Sample size
1,854
1,854
1,854
F-stat.
2.6282
0.0224 * *
5.2213
0.0001 * * *
2.7357
Panel C: dependent variable: rival portfolio’s 2 event firm’s
Intercept
2 0.0020
0.7130
0.0051
0.5122
0.0127
PRECAR
0.0074
0.2994
20.0038
0.7155
20.0127
MKTSHR
0.0137
0.5251
20.0180
0.5643
20.0695
CORR
2 0.0070
0.3665
20.0191
0.0874 *
20.0599
HHI
2 0.0100
0.7153
0.0174
0.6614
0.0549
AVGSTD
0.1071
0.3428
0.2497
0.1274
0.9487
Sample size
1,854
1,854
1,854
F-stat.
0.6112
0.6913
1.4011
0.2208
6.7661

0.8816
0.0048 * * *
0.1651
0.0012 * * *
0.4731
0.0000 * * *
0.0000 * * *
0.0761 *
0.0012 * * *
0.9474
0.9815
0.8551
0.1388
0.0181 * *
0.3240
0.4623
0.1804
0.0013 * * *
0.4061
0.0005 * * *
0.0000 * * *

Notes: Significance at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels; the event stocks include one-day price drops
of 10 percent or more between January 1995 and December 2006 of S&P 500 Index constituents; rival
portfolios are equally weighted portfolios with S&P 500 Index constituents with same four-digit SIC
code of the event stock; PRECAR is the 21-day (220, 0) market model cumulative residual and
MKTSHR is the pre-event percentage of industry sales of the event stock; CORR measures the preevent (2220, 2 21) return correlation between event stock and rival portfolio; HHI measures the
industry’s pre-event sales concentration and AVGSTD is the industry’s average standard deviation of
pre-event (2220, 2 21) daily returns
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the lower the pre-event industry concentration (HHI), the higher its
CAR[þ 4, þ 20]; and
the lower the pre-event industry average standard deviation, the higher its
CAR[þ 4, þ 20].

For the S&P 600 rivals’ stock portfolios (Panel B), the CORR variable’s coefficient is
negative and significant in both the AR[þ 1] and the CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regressions. Also for
the CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regression, the MKTSHR’s coefficient is negative (and significant),
while the HHI’s coefficient is positive (and significant). When these S&P 600 results are
compared to the S&P 500 results for those explanatory variables that are statistically
significant in at least one of the tables, the signs are almost always the same in each table.

AR [þ 1]
Coefficient
p-value

CAR [þ1, þ 3]
Coefficient
p-value

CAR [þ 4, þ 20]
Coefficient
p-value

Panel A: dependent variable: event firm’s post-event market model AR and CARs
Intercept
0.0061
0.2018
0.0079
0.2318
0.0142
PRECAR
20.0131
0.0018 * * *
20.0232
0.0001 * * *
0.0321
MKTSHR
20.0001
0.9965
20.0121
0.5958
0.0773
CORR
20.0216
0.0056 * * *
20.0260
0.0158 * *
0.0122
HHI
20.0053
0.8016
0.0104
0.7209
2 0.0867
AVGSTD
0.0792
0.4214
0.0352
0.7961
2 1.0363
Sample size
4,035
4,035
4,035
F-stat.
3.7230
0.0023 * * *
4.4995
0.0004 * * *
7.4246
Panel B: dependent variable: rival portfolio’s post-event market model AR and CARs
Intercept
0.0007
0.6750
0.0069
0.0166 * *
0.0067
PRECAR
0.0008
0.5907
0.0005
0.8566
0.0031
MKTSHR
20.0082
0.1670
20.0285
0.0039 * * *
2 0.0361
CORR
20.0052
0.0624 *
20.0165
0.0004 * * *
2 0.0103
HHI
0.0053
0.4818
0.0220
0.0809 *
0.0459
AVGSTD
0.0053
0.8814
20.0237
0.6879
2 0.0356
Sample size
4,035
4,035
4,035
F-stat.
2.2066
0.0509 *
6.9961
0.0000 * * *
0.8207
Panel C: dependent variable: rival portfolio’s 2 event firm’s
Intercept
20.0054
0.2785
20.0010
0.8821
2 0.0076
PRECAR
0.0139
0.0013 * * *
0.0237
0.0001 * * *
2 0.0289
MKTSHR
20.0081
0.6355
20.0164
0.4905
2 0.1133
CORR
0.0164
0.0426 * *
0.0095
0.3974
2 0.0225
HHI
0.0106
0.6273
0.0116
0.7022
0.1326
AVGSTD
20.0739
0.4693
20.0589
0.6790
1.0006
Sample size
4,035
4,035
4,035
F-stat.
2.9250
0.0122 * *
3.4640
0.0040 * * *
7.1836

0.2259
0.0019 * * *
0.0568 *
0.5262
0.0936 * *
0.0000 * * *
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0.0000 * * *
0.3344
0.6029
0.1298
0.3592
0.1309
0.8029
0.5347
0.5488
0.0091 * * *
0.0092 * * *
0.2742
0.0168 * *
0.0001 * * *
0.0000 * * *

Notes: Significance at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels; the event stocks include one-day price drops
of 10 percent or more between January 1995 and December 2006 of S&P 600 Index constituents; rival
portfolios are equally weighted portfolios with S&P 600 Index constituents with same four-digit SIC
code of the event stock; PRECAR is the 21-day (2 20, 0) market model cumulative residual and
MKTSHR is the pre-event percentage of industry sales of the event stock; CORR measures the
pre-event (2 220, 221) return correlation between event stock and rival portfolio; HHI measures the
industry’s pre-event sales concentration and AVGSTD is the industry’s average standard deviation of
pre-event (2220, 2 21) daily returns

The only variable whose coefficient is statistically significant in all three tables is the
CORR variable for the CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regression. When the pre-event correlation
between the stock returns for the event firm and its rivals’ is high, the rivals’ stocks’
CAR[þ 1, þ 3] is low.
For the rivals portfolio’s-event stock’s return differential (Panel C), the results tell
nearly the same story as the previously discussed Panel A results; essentially the same
variable coefficients are significant in each Panel and the signs in Panel C are opposite of
those in Panel A; this makes sense since Panel C is essentially Panel B-Panel A.
Overall (across Tables IV-VI), for the event stock return and the rival-event firm
return differential, the prior variables’ coefficients are most frequently statistically
significant in the CAR[þ 4, þ 20] regression. This is surprising in that this is farthest
from the event; however, it does cover a longer period than do the AR[þ 1] and the

Table VI.
Regression analysis of
cumulative residuals of
event stocks and rival
portfolios on event stock
and industry
characteristics – S&P
600 Universe (1995-2006)
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CAR[þ 1, þ 3] periods. For the rivals’ stock portfolios, the pre-event variables’
coefficients are most frequently statistically significant in the CAR[þ 1, þ 3] regression.
IV. Conclusion
Overall for the event stocks, we find the following. Similar to the literature (Cox and
Peterson, 1994; Lang and Stulz, 1992), in the [2 3, 2 1] period, event stocks generally
experience statistically significant negative ARs. The negative pre-event daily ARs
are followed by about 2 13 percent event-day ARs. For the [þ 1, þ 3] period, S&P 600
stocks exhibit statistically significant abnormal reversals; this potentially anomalous
EMH result conflicts with the Cox and Peterson (1994) observation that the [þ 1, þ 3]
price reversal disappears by the October 1987 stock price crash and weakens their
argument that the reversal was due to illiquidity effects that diminished as the markets
became more liquid. Their failure to find significant reversal in the post-October 1987
period may be due to their short post-October 1987 period. Similar to Cox and Peterson
(1994), for both S&P 500 and 600 stocks, event stocks statistically significantly continue
their event-day poor performance in the [þ 4, þ 20] period and the S&P 600 stocks’
underperformance is more severe.
Overall for the event firms’ rivals’ stock portfolios, we find the following results which
are all reasonably consistent with the literature. They experience statistically significant
pre-event day [generally day 23 through day 21] and event-day negative ARs, though
these negative ARs begin about two days later for the small cap stocks than they do for the
large cap stocks. Thus, the contagion effect dominates the competitive effect. There is
somewhat anomalous evidence (strong for the S&P 600, but weak for the S&P 500 stocks)
that the rivals’ negative ARs (i.e. the contagion) continues into the [þ1, þ 3] period
(i.e. there is lagged contagion. There is also some evidence of lagged contagion for the
[220, 21] period.). The lagged contagion (from the event firm’s stock to its rivals’ stocks)
is consistent with the gradual dissemination of information which is accentuated for small
cap stocks because they have fewer analysts following them so that their price
adjustments are slower. The [þ1, þ 3] period continuity for the rivals’ stock returns is an
interesting contrast to the event firms’ contemporaneous return reversal (where each are
more significant for small cap than large cap stocks). It could be the result of a competitive
effect feeding back from the rivals to the event firm (or from a residual bid-ask price
bounce effect). Finally, consistent with the EMH, there is no statistically significant
intra-industry effect (from the event firm to its rivals) for the [þ4, þ 20] period.
The event firms’ stocks performed statistically significantly worse than their rivals’
stock portfolios in the [þ 4, þ 20] period for both the S&P 500 and 600 firms. This result
also apparently violates the EMH. As far as we know, this issue has not been previously
directly addressed in the literature. Typically, performance has been measured relative
to the market and for a shorter post-event period.
Consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, and unlike Cox and Peterson (1994), we
find that the small cap event stocks’ CAR[þ 1, þ 3] (and AR[þ 1]) is negatively related to
their pre-event through event CAR when the MKTSHR variable was included in the
regression as an explanatory variable. This also weakens the Cox and Peterson (1994)
arguments that:
.
the overreaction hypothesis was unjustified since the CAR[þ 1, þ 3] and PRECAR
terms were unrelated when the size term was included as an explanatory
variable; and

.

the reversal was due to illiquidity effects that diminished as the markets became
more liquid by the 1987 stock market crash.

The event firm’s CAR[þ 4, þ 20] is worse:
.
the worse its pre-event through event CAR (i.e. there is under reaction. Cox and
Peterson (1994) did not find these variables to be significantly related but they
considered short periods, i.e. four-year periods);
.
the smaller its pre-event market share (like Cox and Peterson, 1994);
.
the less the pre-event closeness to its rivals;
.
the less competitive the industry; and
.
the riskier the industry.
These results extend the Cox and Peterson (1994) findings that the event firm’s
CAR[þ 4, þ 20] is worse, the smaller the event stock’s capitalization. Industry factors
beyond the market share (size) effect the event firm’s longer period AR continuity.
Factors 3-5 have not been examined in the literature as factors affecting the event firm’s
CAR[þ 4, þ 20].
The rivals’ CAR[þ 1, þ 3] is worse, the greater their pre-event closeness to the event
firm. Their CAR[þ 4, þ 20] is better (significantly for large cap firms, insignificantly
for small cap firms), the higher the event firm’s pre-event through event CAR.
All of the statistically significant CAR[þ4, þ 20] results discussed above seem to
contradict the weak form EMH. Traders have had at least three days to process and act
upon this publicly available event and pre-event information. Also the 17 day return period
is long. One can also argue that the [þ1, þ 3] period results violate the weak form EMH;
however, given its shorter period and closer proximity to the event, the contradiction to the
EMH seems less compelling. Our explanation for these results is as follows.
Our data show that the event firms’ stock prices fall about 13 percent on the event day,
while their rivals’ stock prices fall roughly only about a 30th as much (roughly
0.4 percent). Moreover, much of the rivals’ stocks’ price fall is delayed for up to a couple
days (less so for the large cap stocks than for the small cap stocks since the large cap
stocks are followed more closely by analysts). In part, the rivals’ stocks’ prices
presumably fall much less than the event firms’ stock prices because there are many
rivals for each event stock. While the average rivals’ stock price drop is a small
percentage (roughly 0.4 percent), due to the numbers of rivals, the dollar effect on the
industry can be very large. This prompts a feedback response upon the event firms’
stocks that can be competitive for a couple days [þ 1, þ 3] (mostly noticed for small cap
stocks), but is magnified, gradual, and a contagion over the longer [þ 4, þ 20] period for
which the event firms’ stocks decline an additional 0.8-1.8 percent (again less so for the
large cap stocks than for the small cap stocks since the large cap stocks are followed
more closely by analysts). The gradualness may be explained by the numbers of the
rivals’ stock prices that are feeding back onto the event firm’s stock price and the smaller
rivals’ stock price drop (i.e. less discernable signal), that is precipitating the feedback to
the event firm’s stock price (roughly 0.4 percent rather than the event firm’s initial
13 percent). The magnification is due to the numbers of the rivals’ stock prices that are
feeding back onto the event firm’s stock price. Thus, while we observe the event firm’s
resumed stock price drop in the [þ 4, þ 20] period that was observed in Cox and
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Peterson (1994), we provide an intra-industry effects and feedback explanation. This
explanation is bolstered by the fact that the event firm’s CAR[þ 4, þ 20] is better the:
smaller the event, smaller the event firm’s pre-event market share, more correlated the
event firm and rivals’ stock prices in the pre-event period, less concentrated the industry,
and less risky the industry.
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